Shelly Kagan: Answering Moral Skepticism

Cover: 9780197688984 | Answering Moral Skepticism | Shelly Kagan | Taschenbuch | Englisch

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Beschreibung

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?

Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

Über den Autor

Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. A popular lecturer at Yale, Kagan's lectures on death have been watched online by millions of people around the world, and a book based on the course, Death, has been a national best seller in both S. Korea and Japan. His recent books include How to Count Animals, More or Less (OUP 2019) and The Geometry of Desert (OUP 2012).

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Acknowledgments

A Note to the Reader

Introduction

1. What Would Morality Need to Be?

1.1 Job Descriptions

1.2 Possible Elements

1.3 Satisfying the Job Description

2. Basic Positions in Metaethics

2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism

2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism

2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism

2.4 Moral Skepticism

3. Nihilism

3.1 The Nature of Nihilism

3.2 The Case for Nihilism

3.3 Disregarding the Arguments

3.4 Normative Nihilism

4. Noncognitivism

4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism

4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism

4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism

5. Disagreement

5.1 The Argument from Disagreement

5.2 The Implications of Disagreement

5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement

5.4 Nonconvergence

6. Relativism

6.1 Moral Relativism

6.2 Clarifying Relativism

6.3 Arguing for Relativism

6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories

7. Knowledge

7.1 The Analogy to Observation

7.2 Appearances

7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions

7.4 Reliability

7.5 Intuitionism

8. Evolution

8.1 The Argument from Evolution

8.2 A Second Try

8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics

8.4 Common Ground

8.5 The Continuity Problem

8.6 Path Dependence

9. Explanation

9.1 A Metaphysical Test

9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts

9.3 Reduction and Explanation

9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts

9.5 The Unrestricted Test

10. Motivation

10.1 Motive Internalism

10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism

10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism

10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation

10.5 The Direction of Fit

11. Reasons

11.1 Reasons Internalism

11.2 Reasons

11.3 Refining the Argument

11.4 Hypothetical Reasons

11.5 Rational Support

11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation

12. Reductionism

12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism

12.2 The Nature of Reduction

12.3 The Open Question Argument

12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind

12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction

12.6 Reducing Reasons

13. Simple Realism

13.1 Simple Normative Realism

13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity

13.3 Nonnatural Properties

13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals

14. Moral Realism

14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic

14.2 Systematic Moral Theory

Notes

References

Index

Details

Erscheinungsjahr:	2024
Fachbereich:	Allgemeines
Genre:	Importe , Philosophie
Jahrhundert:	Antike
Rubrik:	Geisteswissenschaften
Thema:	Lexika
Medium:	Taschenbuch
Inhalt:	Kartoniert / Broschiert
ISBN-13:	9780197688984
ISBN-10:	0197688985
Sprache:	Englisch
Einband:	Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor:	Kagan, Shelly
Hersteller:	Oxford University Press OUP USA
Verantwortliche Person für die EU:	Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Abbildungen:	2 b/w charts
Maße:	227 x 157 x 30 mm
Von/Mit:	Shelly Kagan
Erscheinungsdatum:	29.02.2024
Gewicht:	0,576 kg